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Reforming the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court to Curb Executive Branch Abuse of 
Surveillance Techniques 
ABSTRACT 
As intelligence agencies like the NSA increase their surveillance activities 
on law-abiding citizens, the need for protection of privacy rights becomes 
apparent.  The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) was 
designed to protect this fundamental right, but due to changes in the law 
and to the structure of the court, the court’s role as a watchdog has been 
weakened.  This Comment provides an overview of amendments to the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that have tempered the court’s role, 
including the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 (Freedom Act), and discusses 
the need for reform of the FISC due to the unwieldy nature of surveillance 
agencies.  Ultimately, this Comment identifies structural changes that 
could restore the court to the protector of privacy rights that it was initially 
intended to be. 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine placing a call to a relative or an acquaintance in a foreign 
country and automatically having every detail of your call recorded—the 
duration, the contents of the conversation, and your phone number.  You 
are not suspected of any criminal activity; however, an individual that your 
acquaintance contacted is suspected of a terrorist-type plot or some other 
activity that a United States intelligence agency deems threatening to 
national security interests.  Would you feel comfortable having every 
phone conversation recorded for the sake of protecting the country?  In July 
2014, Americans discovered that this was not a hypothetical scenario—the 
United States government was collecting vast amounts of telephone data on 
American citizens.1 
 
 1. See generally Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of 
Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013, 6:05 AM), http://www.theguardian. 
com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order (discussing a court order 
that “shows for the first time that under the Obama administration the communication 
records of millions of US citizens are being collected indiscriminately and in bulk—
regardless of whether they are suspected of any wrongdoing”). 
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In the 1970s, the Executive Branch collected large amounts of data for 
the purpose of protecting national security interests, including 
communications of U.S. citizens.2  In response, Congress passed the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to ensure that the privacy 
rights of American citizens would not be violated.3  FISA set up the FISC, 
primarily to review requests for surveillance to collect foreign intelligence.4  
This system was designed to ensure that the government was not actively 
intercepting wholly domestic communications in an attempt to avoid 
having to obtain a search warrant.5  Subsequent amendments to FISA 
following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, have severely 
handicapped the role of the FISC by lowering the standards that the 
government must meet to obtain permission for surveillance.6  As a result, 
the government has collected a massive amount of information on 
foreigners and Americans alike.7  At the center of the controversy lies the 
National Security Agency (NSA), the United States intelligence agency 
that decides what information can be collected under broad orders issued 
by the FISC.8   
The FISC is in critical need of reform that effectively curtails the 
surveillance state and protects citizens from governmental intrusion into 
individuals’ communications.  Many of the current reform proposals are 
inadequate to address this goal.  To effectuate the original purpose of the 
FISC, the court must be restructured and made more transparent. 
This Comment proposes several reforms that will aid in reining in the 
surveillance state.  First, the FISC needs more sitting judges, and those 
judges’ terms should be extended.  Second, court personnel and judges 
should be empowered with greater investigatory powers, enabling them to 
perform their own research rather than relying solely on information 
 
 2. Jeremy D. Mayer, 9-11 and the Secret FISA Court: From Watchdog to Lapdog?, 34 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 249, 249–50 (2002). 
 3. Id. at 249. 
 4. J. Christopher Champion, Note, The Revamped FISA: Striking a Better Balance 
Between the Government’s Need to Protect Itself and the 4th Amendment, 58 VAND. L. REV. 
1671, 1681 (2005). 
 5. Id. at 1672–73. 
 6. See infra notes 46–75 and accompanying text. 
 7. U.S. Domestic Surveillance, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Dec. 18, 2013), 
http://www.cfr.org/intelligence/us-domestic-surveillance/p9763#p1. 
 8. See Carol D. Leonnig, Court: Ability to Police U.S. Spying Program Limited, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/court-ability-to- 
police-us-spying-program-limited/2013/08/15/4a8c8c44-05cd-11e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_ 
story.html (noting that the FISC relies heavily on the accuracy of information provided to it 
by the NSA because of the court’s practical investigatory limitations and, similarly, it does 
not have the resources to investigate all instances of noncompliance with its orders). 
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supplied by the government.  Third, to increase transparency, the FISC 
should be required to release a reasonably detailed account of its 
procedures for reviewing governmental-surveillance applications. 
Part I of this Comment gives a brief history of FISA and the FISC, as 
well as the subsequent amendments to FISA that have severely weakened 
the role of the court.  Part II exposes how unwieldy the NSA and other 
intelligence-gathering agencies have become, as well as problems with the 
FISC that have played a role in that expansion.  Part III outlines some of 
the most popular reform proposals, such as allowing testimony or input 
from third parties, greater transparency, and greater oversight.  In closing, 
Part IV evaluates the best solutions—those with the highest potential to 
have meaningful and lasting results in reining in surveillance activities—
with a heavy focus on implementing structural changes to the FISC. 
I. HISTORY OF FISA AND THE FISC 
The initial aim of FISA was to curtail abusive intelligence-gathering 
practices taken against American citizens by the Executive Branch that 
were so obtrusive as to raise Fourth Amendment concerns.9  Through the 
amendments to FISA, Congress has expanded FISA’s scope, decreased the 
oversight of government officials conducting surveillance operations, and 
made it easier for communications involving American citizens to be 
monitored.10  Additionally, FISA amendments have given the FISC a more 
limited role to play in intelligence-gathering.11  This lack of oversight has 
allowed the NSA to gather private information on companies and citizens.12 
A. How the FISC Works 
The original FISA of 1978 set up two courts, the FISC and the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR).13  The FISC was 
initially composed of seven sitting federal district court judges who were 
charged with determining when to issue warrants for surveillance.14  
Composed of three circuit court judges, the FISCR was established to hear 
appeals in the event that the FISC denied a government application for 
 
 9. Mayer, supra note 2, at 249. 
 10. See infra notes 76–108 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra notes 109–23 and accompanying text.  
 12. See infra notes 76–123 and accompanying text.  
 13. See Note, Shifting the FISA Paradigm: Protecting Civil Liberties by Eliminating Ex 
Ante Judicial Approval, 121 HARV. L. REV. 2200, 2201 (2008). 
 14. Id. 
3
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surveillance.15  Later amendments increased the number of FISC judges to 
eleven, each selected by the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme 
Court.16  The judges serve for nonrenewable terms of no more than seven 
years and they travel to Washington, D.C. to preside over hearings on a 
rotating basis.17 
FISA courts are established under Article III of the United States 
Constitution through Congress’s power to create inferior courts.18  While 
this fact draws similarities among FISA courts and United States district 
courts and circuit courts of appeal, FISA courts operate unlike any other 
Article III court.19  The proceedings in FISA courts are closed-door, and the 
public typically does not have access to issued opinions.20  Judge Pauley of 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
acknowledges that FISA courts are exceptions to the general openness and 
transparency of Article III courts, citing national security interests as 
justification for their secrecy.21 
1. FISC Consideration of Surveillance Applications 
Because of post-FISA amendments, surveillance applications must 
pass through several rounds of review before they are approved.  In the first 
step toward FISC approval, general counsel at the NSA drafts a warrant 
application at the request of an intelligence-agency officer.22  The Attorney 
General must then certify that the target of surveillance is a “foreign 
power” or an “agent” of a foreign power and, in the case of a United States 
citizen, that the target may be involved in a crime.23  After the court has 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Owen Fiss, Even in a Time of Terror, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 4–5 (2012) 
(citing 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2012)). 
 17. History of the Federal Judiciary: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, FED. 
JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/courts_special_fisc.html (last visited 
Sept. 5, 2015). 
 18. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 731 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013) (referring to the FISC judges as “Article III judges” and noting that the FISC operates 
the same as any other Article III court). 
 19. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 731. 
 20. Id.  The newly enacted Freedom Act allows the Director of National Intelligence, in 
consultation with the Attorney General, to conduct a “declassification review” of FISC and 
FISCR orders that will make opinions, or specific selections from court opinions, “publicly 
available to the greatest extent practicable.”  USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 
114-23, §§ 602(a)–(b), 129 Stat. 268, 281 (2015) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1872(a)–(b) 
(2012)). 
 21. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 731. 
 22. History of the Federal Judiciary, supra note 17. 
 23. Id. 
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this information, it begins a “rigorous review process of applications 
submitted by the executive branch, spearheaded initially by five judicial 
branch lawyers who are national security experts and then by the judges.”24   
There is limited information concerning how the court decides which 
of the government’s requests to approve or deny.  It is also unclear how the 
court interprets important terms in various FISA statutes.25  As Senator Jeff 
Merkley of Oregon points out, “[w]e can’t really propose changes to the 
law unless we know what the words mean as interpreted by the court.”26   
Whatever processes the court employs, it has been heavily criticized 
for its extreme secrecy and for the lack of adversarial proceedings in 
deciding questions of individual privacy.  The lack of transparency risks 
potential abuse, especially since court orders are unavailable to the public 
and the surveillance targets will never know that they were under 
observation.27   
To make matters worse, the FISC grants nearly all of the 
government’s surveillance requests.  In 2012, the FISC reviewed 
approximately 1800 applications and rejected none.28  In 2005, U.S. 
Attorney General Gonzales explained that of the 1758 applications in 2004, 
none were denied, but 94 were substantially modified by the FISC.29  In the 
court’s thirty-three-year history, only 11 of 34,000 applications have been 
rejected.30   
Although there is some evidence that the FISC may modify requests 
before accepting them, the furtive nature of the court’s proceedings and the 
unwillingness to deny the government’s surveillance requests lead many to 
question what the court does behind closed doors.  In fact, some 
 
 24. Spencer Ackerman, FISA Chief Judge Defends Integrity of Court Over Verizon 
Records Collection, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013, 4:17 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2013/jun/06/fisa-court-judge-verizon-records-surveillance.  
 25. Id.  Some of these important terms define what “tangible items” means or, with 
regard to the PATRIOT Act, what “related to an investigation” means.  Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Note, supra note 13, at 2206 (citing Kelly J. Smith, Note, An Enemy of Freedom: 
United States v. James J. Smith and the Assault on the Fourth Amendment, 39 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1395, 1417 (2006)).  But see USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 
§§ 602(a)–(b), 129 Stat. 268, 281 (2015) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1872(a)–(b) (2012)); 
supra note 20. 
 28. Richard Blumenthal, FISA Court Secrecy Must End, POLITICO (July 14, 2013, 11:15 
PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/07/fisa-court-process-must-be-unveiled-94127. 
html. 
 29. USA PATRIOT Act: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 109th 
Cong. 90–91 (2005) (statement of Alberto R. Gonzales, Att’y Gen. of the United States, and 
Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation).  
 30. Blumenthal, supra note 28. 
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characterize the FISC as “a secret kangaroo court that legitimates mass 
surveillance of Americans’ communications with employers, friends, and 
family in other countries by lending it the appearance, but not the 
substance, of judicial oversight.”31 
Because almost all of the government’s surveillance applications are 
accepted, the appeals process through the FISCR is rarely utilized.  
Twenty-four years after its inception, the FISCR met for the first time in 
2002.32  In the unlikely event that the FISC and the FISCR were to deny 
one of the government’s petitions, officials are able to request review by 
the United States Supreme Court.33 
Because of the relaxed FISA requirements, the court now has almost 
meaningless oversight over the intelligence-gathering process.  The FISC 
seems to exist purely for show, giving citizens hollow reassurance that their 
communications are not being unconstitutionally monitored.  Because the 
court’s oversight is so insignificant, the laws governing the FISC must be 
amended to transform the court back to the powerful protector of 
constitutional rights that it was originally intended to be. 
B. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
Congress enacted FISA in 1978 to permit the government to engage in 
electronic surveillance for the purpose of capturing foreign-intelligence 
information.34  Prior to this legislation, the Executive Branch claimed an 
implicit right to perform warrantless electronic surveillance to protect 
national security interests under Article II of the United States Constitution, 
which allows the executive to “preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution of the United States.”35   
In its report, one Senate Committee found that under this regime, the 
government “[had] swept in vast amounts of information about the personal 
 
 31. Jennifer Granick & Christopher Sprigman, The Secret FISA Court Must Go, DAILY 
BEAST (July 24, 2013, 4:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/07/24/the-
secret-fisa-court-must-go.html. 
 32. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 719 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). 
 33. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, ALLGOV.COM, http://www.allgov.com/ 
departments/department-of-justice/foreign-intelligence-surveillance-court?agencyid=7206 
(last visited Sept. 5, 2015). 
 34. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 
1783 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.). 
 35. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7; see also James G. McAdams, III, Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA): An Overview, FED. L. ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CTRS. 2 (2007), 
http://www.fletc.gov/training/programs/legal-division/downloads-articles-and-faqs/research-
by-subject/miscellaneous/ForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceAct.pdf. 
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lives, views, and associations of American citizens.”36  As a result of these 
findings, the Committee recommended that Congress create guidelines to 
ensure that the surveillance process operated legally and efficiently.37 
Congress responded by passing a law on October 5, 1978, that laid out 
procedures with which the Executive Branch would have to comply before 
the FISC would grant an order allowing it to obtain foreign intelligence via 
electronic surveillance.38  The purpose of the new legislation was to protect 
the civil liberties of Americans by preventing the government from 
monitoring citizens’ communications without an individualized warrant, as 
required by the Fourth Amendment.39  The President of the United States 
was authorized to acquire foreign intelligence for up to one year without a 
warrant,40 so long as there was “no substantial likelihood” that any 
communications by a United States citizen would be received.41 
The newly created FISC was tasked with issuing warrants pursuant to 
applications approved by the Attorney General.42  Whenever domestic or 
international telephone calls were transmitted through facilities located in 
the United States, the Attorney General had to seek permission from the 
FISC before intercepting the calls.43  FISA allowed the FISC to issue 
surveillance orders only if there was probable cause that the target of the 
electronic surveillance was a “foreign power” or an “agent of a foreign 
power.”44  In its report, the Senate Intelligence Committee made clear that 
the primary purpose of the surveillance must be for foreign-intelligence 
gathering.45 
The language of FISA and the initial Senate Committee Report point 
to the overarching purpose of FISA: the need to protect the constitutional 
rights of American citizens from encroachment by the government.  
 
 36. S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 5 (1976).  
 37. Id. at 296–98.  
 38. FISA of 1978 §§ 104–105 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804–1805 
(2012)). 
 39. Glenn Greenwald, FISA Court Oversight: A Look Inside a Secret and Empty 
Process, GUARDIAN (June 18, 2013, 7:36 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ 
2013/jun/19/fisa-court-oversight-process-secrecy. 
 40. FISA of 1978 § 102. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. § 104. 
 43. Fiss, supra note 16, at 15. 
 44. FISA of 1978 § 105(a)(3)(A).  
 45. Joshua H. Pike, Note, The Impact of a Knee-Jerk Reaction: The PATRIOT Act 
Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the Ability of One Word to 
Erase Established Constitutional Requirements, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 185, 201 (2007). 
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C. Expansions of FISA  
The amendments to FISA since its promulgation have substantially 
diminished the initial protections of the Act.  The new, more lenient 
standards for obtaining a FISC order ensure that a staggering amount of 
American citizens’ data is swept up during foreign surveillance. 
1.  The PATRIOT Act of 2001 
One month after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress 
amended FISA by enacting an act titled the “Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act,” also known as the USA PATRIOT Act (Patriot 
Act).46  The Patriot Act’s stated purpose is to “provide[] enhanced 
investigative tools and improve[] information sharing for the law 
enforcement and intelligence communities to combat terrorism and 
terrorist-related crimes.”47  By improving investigative tools and 
information sharing, Congress hoped to “assist in the prevention of future 
terrorist activities and the preliminary acts and crimes which further such 
activities.”48  The Patriot Act was the starting point for subsequent 
amendments to FISA that ultimately allowed the government to collect 
information in a wider range of circumstances.49   
The Patriot Act contains three main provisions that authorized the 
expansion of FISA and increased the government’s ability to conduct 
surveillance operations.50  First, the Act requires foreign-intelligence 
gathering to be “a significant purpose” of the surveillance, which is a 
departure from the 1978 Act, which required the collection to be the sole or 
“primary purpose.”51  Second, the Act allows “roving wiretap[s],” which 
authorizes surveillance of any communication to or by a target without 
specifying the particular communications meant to be monitored.52  Finally, 
the Patriot Act allows the government to obtain an order from the FISC for 
 
 46. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272, H.R. REP. NO. 107-236, at 1–42 (2001). 
 47. H.R. REP. NO. 107-236, at 41. 
 48. Id. 
 49. EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40138, AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) EXTENDED UNTIL JUNE 1, 2015, at 1 (2011), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R40138.pdf. 
 50. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), EPIC.ORG, http://epic.org/privacy/ 
terrorism/fisa/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2015). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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a pen register or trap-and-trace device without showing that the target was 
“an agent of a foreign power.”53  
2. Protect America Act of 2007 
Several years after the Patriot Act was enacted, Congress passed the 
Protect America Act (PAA), which some viewed as an expansion on the 
government’s surveillance powers.54  The Department of Justice described 
the purpose of the PAA as modernizing FISA to provide the intelligence 
community with key tools for acquiring information about potential 
terrorists.55  The Department of Justice claimed that the PAA “restore[d] 
FISA to its original focus of protecting the rights of persons in the United 
States, while not acting as an obstacle to gathering foreign intelligence on 
targets located in foreign countries.”56   
The introduction to the PAA explains that “[n]othing in the definition 
of electronic surveillance . . . shall be construed to encompass surveillance 
directed at a person reasonably believed to be located outside of the United 
States.”57  The PAA also lowered the burden of proof needed to perform 
warrantless surveillance from probable cause to a reasonable belief that one 
of the parties to the communication is situated internationally, even if the 
communication comes from a person inside the United States.58  
The major change to FISA by the PAA allowed the Director of 
National Intelligence and the Attorney General to authorize foreign-
intelligence gathering for up to one year on those targets “reasonably 
believed” to be outside of the United States without FISC approval if two 
conditions are met.59  First, based on the information in front of them, the 
 
 53. Id.  A pen register gathers phone numbers from outgoing calls placed on a specific 
line whereas the trap-and-trace device gathers the incoming phone numbers on the line.  Id. 
 54. Cora Currier et al., Mass Surveillance in America: A Timeline of Loosening Laws 
and Practices, PROPUBLICA (June 7, 2013), https://projects.propublica.org/graphics/ 
surveillance-timeline.  
 55. What Is the Protect America Act?, DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/ 
(last visited Sept. 5, 2015). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, § 105A, 121 Stat. 552 (repealed 
2008).  
 58. Stephen Ross Johnson & Anne Passino, The Protect America Act: Who Will Protect 
Us Against the Protectors?, RITCHIE, DILLARD, & DAVIES, P.C. 1–2, http://rddjlaw.com/ 
articles/ProtectAmericaAct.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2015). 
 59. Protect America Act of 2007 § 105B.  The Act did, however, allow for some 
oversight by the FISC within 120 days after issuance of the warrant to determine whether 
the monitoring constituted electronic surveillance.  Id. § 105C (“No later than 120 days after 
the effective date of this Act, the Attorney General shall submit to the Court . . . the 
procedures by which the Government determines that acquisitions conducted pursuant to 
9
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Director and Attorney General must determine that there are reasonable 
procedures in place for determining that the persons to be surveilled are 
located outside of the United States.60  Second, a “significant purpose” of 
the surveillance must be to obtain foreign-intelligence information, and 
adequate minimization procedures that meet the statutory directive must be 
in place.61   
3. FISA Amendments Act of 2008 
On July 10, 2008, FISA was once again amended, this time by the 
FISA Amendments Act of 2008.62  One of the main provisions of the 2008 
Act allows the FISC to approve surveillance of targets outside the United 
States without an individualized court order, thus allowing the government 
to respond quickly in time-sensitive situations.63  These blanket warrants 
require the FISC to review, only on a yearly basis, certifications that 
identify categories of foreign-intelligence targets, as submitted by the 
Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence.64 
Proponents of the amendment argue that it provided a streamlined, 
more efficient approval process for establishing surveillance of targets 
located overseas.65  These proponents emphasize that overseas surveillance 
does not implicate Fourth Amendment concerns,66 arguing that the 
amended FISA has been “extremely valuable” in protecting the country 
from terrorists and other national security threats.67   
Critics of the FISA Amendment Acts maintain that the amendment 
has nearly eviscerated the original FISA system.68  The FISC has a limited 
 
section 105B do not constitute electronic surveillance.”).  Some commenters suggested that 
this oversight was not effective because the expanded definition of “electronic surveillance” 
created a dragnet effect and the Attorney General was not required to explain to the court 
how the information of American citizens is treated upon interception.  Johnson & Passino, 
supra note 58, at 2. 
 60. Protect America Act of 2007 § 105B.  
 61. Id.  
 62. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436. 
 63. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & OFFICE OF DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, BACKGROUND 
PAPER ON TITLE VII OF FISA, S. REP. NO. 112-229, app. at 30 (2012). 
 64. Id. app. at 31. 
 65. FISA Amendments Act of 2008: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 24 (2012) 
(statement of Kenneth L. Wainstein, Partner, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP) 
[hereinafter FAA Hearing]. 
 66. Id. at 25. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Mitra Ebadolahi, Warrantless Wiretapping Under the FISA Amendments Act, HUM. 
RTS., Mar. 2013, at 11, 11. 
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oversight role, since it no longer makes individualized probable-cause 
determinations and no longer oversees whether the surveillance targets are 
inappropriately located inside the United States.69   
Four years after the FISA Amendments Act was passed, Congress 
extended the Act for five more years.70  At the reauthorization hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 
Representative Bobby Scott of Virginia described the Act as “result[ing] in 
massive amounts of information being collected with an untold amount of 
it affecting Americans in America.”71  Representative John Conyers, Jr. of 
Michigan  explained that the FISA Amendments Act allows the FISC to 
issue orders for sweeping, mass-surveillance programs rather than 
approving individual targets.72  Instead of requiring the government to 
identify specific individuals, the court now merely certifies that procedures 
are in place to ensure the proposed surveillance targets only foreigners 
outside of the United States.73   
Rather than engaging in a meaningful review of the proposed 
surveillance, the FISC simply rubberstamps the government’s request if the 
court sees that general surveillance procedures are in place.  Once the court 
approves the procedures, no further judicial review occurs on the targets 
that are selected for surveillance.74  Some commentators have criticized the 
process, stating that “the FISC issues a blanket surveillance order whenever 
the government mouths the correct words—that it is collecting foreign-
 
 69. Id. 
 70. FISA Amendments Act Reauthorization Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-238, § 2, 126 
Stat. 1631. 
 71. FAA Hearing, supra note 65, at 15 (statement of Rep. Robert C. “Bobby” Scott, 
Member, H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec.). 
 72. Id. at 16 (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr., Member, H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary).  Representative Conyers stated: 
Although the foreign intelligence surveillance court has some measure of 
oversight over these programs, the sweeping and general nature of this authority 
has given many cause for concern.   
For example, the government may describe its operations to the court in 
exceptionally general terms—as broad as “all phone calls, emails, and text 
messages originating in Pakistan”—and conduct wide-ranging, dragnet 
surveillance from there.  Although the law requires the government to use 
“minimization procedures” that limit the impact of these programs on American 
citizens, there is no question that the government can and does intercept and listen 
in on the communications of U.S. persons.  
Id.  
 73. Fiss, supra note 16, at 17–18 (citing 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a(a)–(g) (2012)). 
 74. Greenwald, supra note 39. 
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intelligence information relevant to a non-U.S. target.  The FISC provides 
very little independent oversight of the surveillance itself.”75 
II. IMMEDIATE NEED FOR REFORM 
A. Recent Revelations 
Until June 9, 2013, the majority of Americans were ignorant about the 
true breadth of the United States’s intelligence-gathering and domestic 
surveillance programs.  On that day, The Guardian released classified 
documents obtained by an NSA subcontractor, Edward Snowden, who 
worked for the defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton.76  Snowden, a 
self-described whistleblower, implicated the NSA in a vast surveillance 
program that routinely gathered the communications of millions of 
American citizens.77  By publishing a top secret PATRIOT Act order 
handed down from the FISC in April 2013,78 Snowden’s leak set off an 
enormous backlash against the NSA and the FISC regarding the manner in 
which foreign intelligence is being gathered.   
The court order from April 25, 2013, demanded that Verizon Wireless 
turn over all of its information on telephone calls on an “ongoing, daily 
basis,”79 giving the government unlimited authority to obtain information 
on millions, perhaps billions, of telephone calls for a three-month period.80  
Authored by Judge Vinson, the order specifically requires Verizon to turn 
over all call detail records, also known as telephony metadata, of calls 
between the United States and other countries or those that take place 
wholly within the United States.81  Although telephony metadata does not 
include the collection of the contents of the conversation, all other call 
details are given to the NSA, such as the numbers of both parties, call 
duration, and location information.82  While the metadata seemingly gives 
off only innocuous information, the NSA can use the data to form a 
 
 75. Granick & Sprigman, supra note 31.  
 76. Glenn Greenwald et al., Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower Behind the NSA 
Surveillance Revelations, GUARDIAN (June 9, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.theguardian. 
com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Andy Greenberg, Intelligence Officials Admit That Edward Snowden’s NSA Leaks 
Call For Reforms, FORBES (Sept. 13, 2013, 3:37 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
andygreenberg/2013/09/13/intelligence-officials-admit-that-edward-snowdens-leaks-call-for 
-reforms/. 
 79. Greenwald, supra note 1.  
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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comprehensive picture of an individual’s personal relationships and other 
intimate details about the individual’s life.83 
Judge Vinson’s order is an example of a blanket warrant, which 
allows the FISC to sign off on the collection of vast amounts of domestic 
communications.  Two district court judges recently ruled on the 
constitutionality of the blanket warrants and came to opposite conclusions 
on whether to enjoin the bulk collection of metadata by the NSA.   
In Klayman v. Obama,84 Judge Richard Leon of the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia enjoined the NSA after 
explaining his concern with the Agency engaging in systematic 
noncompliance with the FISC-ordered minimization procedures.85  The 
method by which the NSA searches its massive database, a three-degrees-
of-separation type search from the main search term, rakes in much 
information that Judge Leon describes as having a “spiderweb-like 
reach.”86   
Less than two weeks after Judge Leon’s ruling in Klayman, Judge 
William Pauley of the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York found that the bulk collection of metadata was not 
unconstitutional, arguing that “[t]his blunt tool only works because it 
collects everything.”87   
The main point of disagreement between Judge Leon and Judge 
Pauley comes from a 1979 United States Supreme Court case, Smith v. 
Maryland.88  In Smith, the police were monitoring a pen register, a device 
installed by the telephone company that recorded the numbers dialed from 
Smith’s home.89  The Supreme Court held that individuals have no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers because they 
turn that information over to a third party, the phone company.90   
Judge Pauley relied on Smith v. Maryland to rule against 
unconstitutionality,91 whereas Judge Leon refused to extend the logic of 
Smith to the case before him.92  Judge Leon believed that the issue in Smith 
was not comparable because the bulk collection of telephone metadata at 
issue in Klayman was markedly different from a simple pen register, and 
 
 83. Granick & Sprigman, supra note 31.  
 84. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 85. Id. at 39 n.62, 43. 
 86. Id. at 17 n.21. 
 87. ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 88. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 89. Id. at 737. 
 90. Id. at 745–46. 
 91. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 749–52. 
 92. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 31–32 (D.D.C. 2013).  
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the same rules could not be used to evaluate the constitutionality of new, 
more powerful technology.93  The conflict increases the odds that the 
Supreme Court will soon weigh in on the constitutionality of the blanket 
warrants.94 
Much like the FISA courts, until recently, the NSA was an executive 
agency that operated almost exclusively behind closed doors and hid many 
secrets from public view.  Operating with little to no oversight over the 
data-collection process, in 2010, the NSA intercepted 1.7 billion e-mails 
and phone calls per day.95  By March 2013, the Agency had amassed an 
estimated three billion pieces of intelligence from United States 
communications networks.96  Using these dragnet tactics, it is inevitable 
that the Agency is collecting and storing a plethora of information on 
millions of innocent Americans.   
Through an FISC-approved program called PRISM, the NSA has been 
able to send task instructions to the servers of Internet companies and 
social media networks, such as Apple, Yahoo!, Skype, and Google, to 
obtain chats, e-mails, photographs, and other documents.97  The NSA 
assures United States citizens that it is capable of extracting all of the 
information obtained through PRISM, but because of current regulations, it 
does not attempt to.98  The Agency is capable, however, of retaining all 
records from telecommunications companies for up to five years.99  
Analysts access the mass amount of data and enter search terms to make 
sure that, with 51% confidence, the content they are reading is produced by 
a foreign target.100  However, a confidence level this low is unconvincing. 
The NSA’s overreaching does not stop with the United States.  The 
Agency has been known to monitor foreign entities that pose no immediate 
threat to national security, including foreign officials and other well-known 
 
 93. Id. at 32. 
 94. Adam Liptak & Michael S. Schmidt, Judge Upholds N.S.A.’s Bulk Collection of 
Data on Calls, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/28/us/nsa-
phone-surveillance-is-lawful-federal-judge-rules.html?_r=0. 
 95. Greenwald, supra note 39. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine 
U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-
internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb 
04497_story.html. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 30 (D.D.C. 2013).  
 100. Gellman & Poitras, supra note 97. 
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public figures.101  After German Chancellor Angela Merkel discovered that 
the NSA was monitoring her personal cell phone, she reportedly had some 
choice words for President Obama, telling him that the surveillance tactics 
were reminiscent of the Stasi, the powerful secret police of Communist 
East Germany.102  Merkel also voiced concern about the NSA’s inability to 
keep classified information secret, considering how easy it was for 
Snowden to obtain secrets and release them to the world.103   
In another recent snafu, the NSA reportedly spied on Pope Francis 
during the Vatican conclave by intercepting data on telephone calls.104  The 
information obtained was divided into four categories—leadership 
intentions, threats to financial system, foreign policy objectives, and human 
rights—all of which are a far cry from foreign-intelligence gathering in the 
interest of national security.105 
If the surveillance state is not quickly reined in, the United States will 
cease to be the beacon of freedom in the international community and will 
lose the trust of other foreign nations.  Blowback from other countries may 
result in intelligence agencies becoming adversarial and more reticent to 
share information with the United States.106  Foreign leaders have recently 
castigated the United States, with Germany threatening to delay United 
States–European Union trade discussions, and the President of Brazil 
cancelling a visit to the White House in protest.107  In an address at the 
Opening Debate of the United Nations General Assembly, the President of 
Brazil condemned the NSA surveillance program and its intrusion into 
foreign countries, stating that “[a] sovereign nation can never establish 
 
 101. James Ball, NSA Monitored Calls of 35 World Leaders After US Official Handed 
Over Contacts, GUARDIAN (Oct. 25, 2013, 2:50 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2013/oct/24/nsa-surveillance-world-leaders-calls.  
 102. Ian Traynor & Paul Lewis, Merkel Compared NSA to Stasi in Heated Encounter 
with Obama, GUARDIAN (Dec. 17, 2013, 1:23 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-obama. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Nick Squires, US ‘Spied on Future Pope Francis During Vatican Conclave,’ 
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 30, 2013, 6:35 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ 
europe/italy/10415228/US-spied-on-future-Pope-Francis-during-Vatican-conclave.html. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Michael Young, Backlash Inevitable as No One Likes Being Spied Upon, NATIONAL 
(July 11, 2013), http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/backlash-
inevitable-as-no-one-likes-being-spied-upon.  
 107. See Karen Kornbluh, Could the Revelations Regarding the NSA PRISM Program 
Hinder U.S. Relations Around the World?, COUNCIL FOREIGN REL. (Oct. 7, 2013), 
http://www.cfr.org/defense-and-security/could-revelations-regarding-nsa-prism-program-
hinder-us-relations-around-world/p31566 (responding to a question submitted by Andre 
Ribeiro from LaGuardia Community College). 
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itself to the detriment of another sovereign nation.  The right to safety of 
citizens of one country can never be guaranteed by violating fundamental 
human rights of citizens of another country.”108   
B. Problems with the FISC 
Originally intended to keep the Executive Branch in check and to 
ensure that American citizens were not spied on without some suspicion of 
wrongdoing, the FISC has now morphed into a rubber stamp for the 
government’s fishing expeditions.  The post-9/11 amendments to FISA 
have played a large part in significantly weakening the oversight role of the 
FISC.   
After the FISA Amendments Act, the court need not evaluate probable 
cause or require individualized suspicion of the proposed target.109  The 
government is never required to identify its targets to the court, or to 
anyone else for that matter.110  Recently, the chief judge of the FISC, 
Reggie Walton, admitted that the court’s limited resources do not provide 
the ability to determine whether surveillance operations violate the court’s 
orders.111  The court must rely on the information provided by the 
government in deciding to grant the surveillance request.112  After the court 
grants the request, it cannot investigate noncompliance with the orders.113  
Considering the numerous accounts of the NSA’s over-collection of 
information, the expansion of the original FISA should have come with 
more oversight by the FISC, not less. 
Again, making matters worse is the fact that the FISC operates under 
extreme secrecy.114  Its opinions never see the light of day, with a few very 
rare exceptions, and all hearings are closed to the public.115  A real and 
urgent need exists to keep national security secrets classified that may be 
contained in these opinions.  Alternatively, allowing the FISC to operate as 
a largely autonomous entity creates dangerous precedent for future 
 
 108. H. E. Dilma Rousseff, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, Statement at 
the Opening of the General Debate of the 68th Session of the U.N. G.A. at 1 (Sept. 24, 
2013), http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/BR_en.pdf. 
 109. Ebadolahi, supra note 68. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Leonnig, supra note 8. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Eric Lichtblau, In Secret, Court Vastly Broadens Powers of N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES 
(July 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/us/in-secret-court-vastly-broadens-
powers-of-nsa.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0. 
 115. Id. 
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intelligence-gathering operations.116  Seemingly, the court effectuates the 
FISA by relying solely on the government’s position in each individual 
case it hears. 
Even more disconcerting is the fact that the FISC does not operate in 
an adversarial manner like a normal Article III court where both parties 
brief a case and the court hears oral arguments from both sides.117  The 
process is ex parte, meaning the government files the application for 
surveillance, the court receives only the government’s briefing, and the 
government is the only party to appear before the court for an oral 
argument.118  Critics aptly point out “in a fight where only one side is 
allowed to show up, the government’s view almost always prevails.”119   
This environment is not likely to produce reliable legal decisions, as 
the judges do not have the benefit of hearing countervailing arguments or a 
full factual record upon which to base an informed determination.120  
“Judges can’t be expected to be both neutral arbiters of the law and 
advocates for the defense,” just as the government cannot be expected to 
present facts that do not support its interpretations.121   
Ex parte procedures are common in criminal law where law-
enforcement officers are granted warrants without a formal adversarial 
hearing; however, the criminally accused have the option of filing motions 
to suppress evidence uncovered pursuant to the issued warrant.122  On the 
other hand, in the national security context, the goal of surveillance is to 
covertly monitor targets.  Naturally, allowing the validity of the application 
for surveillance to be litigated would defeat the purpose.123   
A process cloaked in such secrecy and capable of having a high 
degree of error should, at the very least, have adequate safeguards to ensure 
the court’s decision is based on a complete factual record.   
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Granick & Sprigman, supra note 31.  
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Orin Kerr, A Proposal to Reform FISA Court Decisionmaking, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (July 8, 2013, 1:12 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/07/08/a-proposal-to-
reform-fisa-court-decisionmaking/. 
 121. Ideas for Reforming the FISA Court, WASH. POST (July 23, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ideas-for-reforming-the-fisa-court/2013/07/23/9a 
3f35e4-f31b-11e2-bdae-0d1f78989e8a_story.html. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
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III. REFORM PROPOSALS 
Recent reform proposals generally fall into four categories.  The first 
involves allowing outside third parties to act as opposing parties or 
advocates in FISC proceedings, such as conducting adversarial hearings 
and allowing amici curiae and special advocates before the court.  The 
second proposal involves increasing transparency in court documents and 
proceedings by declassifying opinions.  The third proposal calls for 
Congress to maintain more oversight over intelligence agencies.  The 
fourth and final major proposal involves ending the FISC and replacing it 
with a more effective solution. 
A. Allowing Testimony or Guidance from Third Parties 
1. Adversarial Hearings 
The first of the primary proposals for improving the FISC and 
restoring confidence in its decisions is to appoint attorneys to oppose the 
government’s surveillance requests.124  This idea originated two decades 
ago when a lawyer in the Carter Administration who helped set up the 
FISC argued before Congress that the court should have an option to ask 
for a briefing by outside counsel when the judge wanted to hear an 
opposing viewpoint in a particular case.125  The proposed system would 
ideally involve appointing independent attorneys to individual cases, and 
giving those attorneys security clearance on a limited basis.126  When the 
government is the only party present and it has the benefit of national 
security expertise, the FISC must have a skeptical opposing party to 
challenge the government’s legal arguments.127 
Critics of this proposal claim that the appointed attorneys will 
essentially have no clients to guide the litigation.128  Without a client, many 
of these attorneys run the risk of being ideologues who are more concerned 
with changing policy and voicing their own views than with advocating for 
 
 124. Stewart Baker, Critiquing FISA Reforms, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 1, 2013, 5:54 
AM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/08/01/critiquing-fisa-reforms/ (referring to the author’s 
own testimony on FISA reform before the Senate Judiciary in 2013). 
 125. Ideas for Reforming the FISA Court, supra note 121. 
 126. Baker, supra note 124 (noting that appointing lawyers to counter government-
surveillance requests is impractical because it would take too long to clear entire law offices 
that work on these individual cases, and that lawyers would struggle in deciding which 
policy arguments to make without clients to guide the decision-making process). 
 127. Note, supra note 13, at 2207. 
 128. Baker, supra note 124. 
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an unknown client.129  Considering the time-sensitive nature of the 
information that could be obtained from surveillance of a target, this 
proposal may be too time-consuming, as the opposing party would have to 
have sufficient time to review, investigate the government’s claim, and 
develop a defense.130  In the interim, a terrorist plot or other national 
security disaster could be unfolding. 
Another viable criticism is that there are already numerous individuals 
in the FISC hearing process to serve as checks on the government’s 
position, such as law clerks, inspectors general, and intelligence 
community staffers.131  The government’s attorneys come from the Justice 
Department, which also serves as a check on the intelligence community 
and is theoretically compelled to provide all the facts and arguments the 
court needs to make a decision.132   
While this line of thought ideally is sound, it is not likely the reality.  
The Department of Justice is also an executive agency and, rather than 
serving as a beacon of truth and justice, likely endures enormous pressure 
to maintain the status quo in the name of preserving national security. 
2. Amici Curiae 
A second proposal for third-party involvement suggests adoption of 
amicus curiae to assist the court in determining the privacy and liberty 
interests implicated by the surveillance application.133  While section 401 of 
the Freedom Act provides for amicus curiae,134 it fails to allow these legal 
experts to participate in the court’s decision-making process in a 
meaningful way.  
 Section 401 of the Freedom Act states that the FISC and FISCR “shall 
appoint an individual . . . to serve as amicus curiae to assist such court in 
the consideration of any application for an order or review that, in the 
opinion of the court, presents a novel or significant interpretation of the 
law, unless the court issues a finding that such appointment is not 
appropriate.”135  Despite the use of the word “shall” in section 401, the law 
allows the court to evade this requirement if it finds that an appointment is 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. Note, supra note 13, at 2214. 
 131. Baker, supra note 124. 
 132. Id. 
 133. ANDREW NOLAN & RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43362, 
REFORM OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURTS: PROCEDURAL AND 
OPERATIONAL CHANGES 11 (2014), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R43362.pdf.  
 134. USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401, 129 Stat. 268, 279 
(2015). 
 135. Id. § 401(i)(2)(A), 129 Stat. at 279. 
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not “appropriate.”136  Moreover, the new law leaves to “the opinion of the 
court” whether “any application for an order or review . . . presents a novel 
or significant interpretation of the law.”137  In other words, if the court 
decides that a case does not present a novel or significant issue, the amicus 
curiae have no role in that proceeding.   
While the provision for amicus curiae in section 401 of the Freedom 
Act is a step in the right direction, it is unlikely that the new law will allow 
amicus curiae to participate in a meaningful way.   
3. Special Advocate 
Finally, absent from the Freedom Act is language in earlier legislation 
that provided for a “public interest advocate” with “access to all relevant 
evidence” in matters before the FISC.138  A public interest advocate, 
defined by the earlier legislation, would have had the ability to “petition the 
court to order the Federal Government to produce documents, materials, or 
other evidence necessary to perform the duties of the public interest 
advocate.”139  Perhaps most importantly, one report indicates that “[o]nce a 
Special Advocate ha[d] been invited to participate with respect to an 
application or other matter, the Special Advocate . . . should have access to 
all government filings.”140  
Unfortunately, the Freedom Act provides much less-expansive access 
to necessary information than earlier legislation would have granted to 
special advocates.  Under the Freedom Act, there is a possibility that 
amicus curiae might not be able to obtain basic court documents, such as 
preliminary briefing and docket materials.  The provision for special 
advocates in the 2013 legislation would have been a better reform measure 
for the FISC.  
B. Increased Transparency 
The second major proposal involves increasing transparency in FISC 
activities.  The gist of this proposal is that the FISC may become more 
wary of surveillance requests and exercise more caution and scrutiny 
 
 136. Id.  The court is required only to issue a “finding” explaining that it has found an 
appointment unnecessary.  Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. H.R. 3159, 113th Cong. § 2(b)(i)(3)(C) (2013). 
 139. Id. 
 140. PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS 
PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE 
OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 186 (2014), 
http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pclob-215.pdf.  
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before approval once the spotlight is trained on the court and their practices 
come to light.  One method of bringing some of the court’s practices to 
light is by declassifying more opinions.141  Currently, the court rarely 
declassifies opinions and when it does, the opinions are heavily edited so 
the sources of information and the methods the court uses to make 
determinations are not compromised.142  All of the facts are highly 
classified, and therefore it is almost impossible to evaluate how the court 
applied legal principles to reach its decision.143   
There is also very little information available about the proceedings in 
the FISC.  The bulk of information available to the public consists of a 
letter to Patrick Leahy, Chairman of the Commission on the Judiciary in the 
Senate, from Reggie Walton, a presiding FISC judge.144  This letter 
contains a brief, and not very descriptive, account of the process the court 
employs when considering applications for electronic surveillance under 
the FISA.145  A second source of information is the Rules of Procedure for 
the FISC.146  Neither of these sources provides an abundance of 
information regarding what goes on inside the court.   
Some argue that national security interests would not be harmed if the 
FISC were to merely release summaries of its legal conclusions and the 
underlying reasoning.147  A more open system would not require disclosure 
of individual targets, but tactics and an explanation of how the surveillance 
programs work, at least at a general level, should be disclosed.148  Rather 
than releasing declassified documents in a haphazard way, Congress could 
step in to set up a system that releases information on an ongoing basis.149   
The unspoken hope behind the transparency proposal is that once the 
public knows what is happening behind closed doors, it will be in a better 
position to monitor the constitutionality of FISC activities.  Once citizens 
know what the FISC court actually does and how it interprets legal texts, 
 
 141. See Baker, supra note 124. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Letter from Reggie B. Walton, Presiding Judge, U.S. Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court, to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary 1–2 (July 
29, 2013), https://www.fas.org/irp/news/2013/07/fisc-leahy.pdf. 
 145. See id. at 1–5.  
 146. See RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE FISA CT., http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
rules/FISC2010.pdf.  
 147. Kerr, supra note 120. 
 148. Granick & Sprigman, supra note 31.  
 149. Continued Oversight of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 10 (2013) (statement of Carrie F. Cordero, 
Director of National Security Studies & Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University 
Law Center). 
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the public may accept its role as a watchdog over the government’s 
surveillance activities.  If citizens do not approve of the FISC’s operations 
and tactics, they would be in a better position to pressure their 
representatives into changing the current structure of FISA and the FISC.   
C. Increased Oversight 
The third reform proposal involves a reform of the intelligence-
gathering process.  Critics take varied approaches to this proposal, but one 
common link unites all—the current system does not effectively oversee 
the activities of the FISC to ensure that it does not overstep constitutional 
bounds.  One line of suggestions focuses on changing the operating 
structure of the intelligence agencies so that overly broad data collection is 
less likely to occur.150   
Under the current system, there are offices in the Executive Branch 
that oversee the NSA and other intelligence agencies to ensure that the 
agencies are compliant in their intelligence-gathering efforts.151  If the 
agencies were adequately funded to put in the manpower required to 
oversee the tremendous job of intelligence-gathering, it is less likely that 
information incidental to individual targets would be collected.152  
Congress should also use its oversight activities to reduce the complexity of 
operating procedures within the agencies so that employees at the ground 
level have a clear grasp on the appropriate rules to follow.153  None of these 
ideas deal with the larger problem of the agencies obtaining the initial 
authority to conduct large-scale surveillance activities.  If the NSA cannot 
be relied on to follow the FISC court orders initially, it cannot be relied on 
to internally monitor its collection process in a way that ensures that mass 
amounts of incidental information are not being collected.   
Others propose that Congress amend FISA to enhance the power of 
the Oversight Section of the Department of Justice’s National Security 
Division.154  The Oversight Section could fulfill the role of independent 
outside counsel in FISC proceedings by filing motions to oppose 
applications and supporting briefs.155  One major concern with this proposal 
is that the swift-moving process of FISC approval will become slower due 
to litigation.156  More importantly, the Oversight Section cannot be trusted 
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to adequately protect civil liberties because it is not truly independent of 
the intelligence-gathering process.157   
The most noteworthy idea is to allow Congress to oversee more of the 
intelligence-gathering process and to minimize the role of the FISC.  
Making Congress primarily responsible for intelligence-gathering 
procedures would force public debate and lead to serious thought on how 
best to balance security with privacy.158  Citizens would be in a position to 
demand accountability from their representatives rather than from a secret 
court that the majority of Americans do not know exists.159  Congress 
should frequently hear testimony from intelligence agencies that fully 
disclose the time, place, target, and the reasons for surveillance.160  Rather 
than prematurely approving surveillance requests, the court would engage 
in an after-the-fact review to determine whether the surveillance was 
reasonable and compliant with Fourth Amendment requirements.161 
D. Ending the FISC 
The fourth—and likely the most extreme—proposal is to bury the 
FISC and replace it with a more effective oversight mechanism.  As critics 
have pointed out, it may be high time for the FISC to go, because it was not 
designed for the purpose of determining the legitimacy of mass 
surveillance programs.162  At FISA’s inception, when specific persons and 
facilities were being targeted, the court served a valid oversight role and 
protected against government encroachment, but today the government 
collects everyone’s communications.163  Given the current path and track 
record of the FISC in approving surveillance requests, there is no chance 
that the court will serve as a wall between citizens and government 
overreaching.164  This extreme step is unwarranted.  The FISC has a valid 
and helpful role to play in curbing government excess in the national 
security realm, but it cannot realize that potential under the current system. 
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IV. MOST-ACCEPTABLE REFORM PROPOSALS 
Reforming the FISC is not an easy task.  There are no obvious 
answers to the difficult national security matters that are implicated.  
However, there are three main concerns that every serious FISC reform 
proposal must address.  The primary obstacle in reforming the FISC, and 
what all critics struggle with in their proposals, is how to effectively 
balance the need for discretion and secrecy in foreign-intelligence decisions 
with the competing interest in openness to ensure that Americans’ privacy 
rights are not continuously violated.  Additionally, every proposal should 
provide for a process that moves quickly to address the time constraints 
inherent in national security concerns.  Finally, constitutional constraints on 
Congress’s ability to impose rules and increased oversight over the FISC 
must also be considered. 
Because the current reform proposals and the recently enacted 
Freedom Act leave gaps, it is necessary to supplement them with other 
changes.  Additional reforms should focus on changing the structure of the 
court—namely, altering the current structure that the court follows to hear 
applications, and giving judges and staffers more investigatory powers.  To 
allow for a more open process without compromising national security, the 
FISC should also publish an established procedure for hearing applications. 
A. Changes in Court Personnel 
Currently, the FISC is composed of eleven district court judges who 
hear applications and grant electronic surveillance orders.165  Only one 
judge sits on the court each week and reviews each application along with a 
staff attorney’s analysis of the application.166  Applications involving novel 
or complex issues are occasionally given a lengthier review.167  Legal 
staffers on the court frequently communicate with the government, and a 
hearing is held only when the judge determines that additional information 
is needed.168  
The rotating judge schedule has been criticized in several ways.  First, 
there may be a lack of continuity in decision making on surveillance 
applications.169  Surveillance applications may be decided in a variety of 
 
 165. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(1) (2012). 
 166. Letter from Reggie B. Walton, Presiding Judge, U.S. Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court, to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, supra 
note 144, at 1–2. 
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 169. Andrew Weissmann, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court: Is Reform 
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ways, and FISC precedent may suffer as a result.  Second, each FISC judge 
has less experience in dealing with national security issues and in dealing 
with problematic surveillance applications.170  More time spent in total on 
the court increases each judge’s knowledge about the delicate balance 
between national security and protecting individual rights, thus increasing 
consistency among opinions.171   
A relatively simple series of solutions would put an end to these issues 
and would provide much-needed reform to the FISC.  First, rather than one 
judge sitting on the court deciding applications each week, multiple judges 
should grant or deny applications at the same time.  At least three judges 
sitting on the FISC at the same time would help to alleviate the fractured 
decision-making process that leads to expansive surveillance operations.  
Multiple judges would also preserve continuity on the court, as each judge 
would gain more experience. 
Normally, the one judge sitting on the court each week operates on a 
strict time frame for each application due to the fast-paced nature of 
national security concerns.  At any given time, that judge is dealing with 
multiple applications with quick turnaround times.  It is not implausible to 
believe that the workload placed on one judge may cause some key details 
in applications to fall through the cracks, resulting in decisions that are 
made without complete information.   
Increasing the number of judges that sit on the court at any given time 
would reduce the number of applications before any one judge and would 
ensure a more thorough review of each application.  The less time pressure 
that a judge is under, the more complete and informed the surveillance 
decision will be. 
Secondly, judges should sit on the court for several weeks at a time, 
rather than for one-week periods.  This would provide each judge with 
more experience in dealing with applications and in determining when an 
application should be granted.  More importantly, this would foster 
continuity in decision making.  If each judge were to serve for a month at a 
time, this would provide the opportunity to develop precedent that can be 
built upon and followed by the next judges.   
 
post-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-court-reform-needed/ (explaining that there may be 
less continuity in FISC decisions than in decisions from other federal courts).  
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 171. See id. (explaining the view of some that permanent clerks solve the FISC’s 
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B. Additional Investigatory Powers 
If the court were granted supplementary investigatory powers beyond 
the face of the warrant, the odds are lower that an application that exceeds 
the permissible scope of surveillance would pass review.  Currently, a 
member of the FISC staff reviews the application to determine if it meets 
the statutory framework.172  Often, a staff attorney will converse with the 
government to receive additional information about the surveillance 
application.173  Based on the staff attorney’s feedback, the FISC judge then 
decides whether to approve the application with or without a hearing or 
whether to impose conditions on approval.174  This entire process is carried 
out mostly internally.  The only party to give the court any information 
external to the application is the government.   
Considering the delicate balance between individual privacy and the 
need for intelligence collection, the court should have procedures in place 
that allow it to retrieve information from an outside source other than the 
party seeking application approval.  Allowing court personnel to perform 
outside information gathering would provide staffers and judges with more 
information to render a more factually complete judgment.  A more-
complete picture may make judges wary of granting overreaching 
applications. 
Specifically, court personnel should have the ability to research the 
government’s application.  Information that the government gives on 
targeted individuals and any incidental surveillance that may be swept in on 
innocent individuals may be tainted by the desire to have the request 
granted.  The eagerness to surveil a suspected terrorist may cause the 
government representative to fail to accurately disclose key facts to the 
court.  The court should be empowered to do behind-the-scenes research on 
exactly who the surveillance will target and the amount of surveillance on 
secondary individuals that will be swept in.   
To perform this research, the court should have several staffers with 
national security experience, possibly former intelligence agency 
employees, and the appropriate security clearance to view classified 
documents.  The government should then turn over most of the information 
that they have to the staffers and aid them in going over the material and 
answering any questions.  Ideally, these staffers would have contacts at the 
 
 172. Letter from Reggie B. Walton, Presiding Judge, U.S. Foreign Intelligence 
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CIA or with other intelligence agencies to determine the degree of 
surveillance that may be appropriate on a particular target. 
Rather than taking the government’s word at face value, this 
extracurricular information-gathering would allow the FISC judges to 
determine if the risk of violating countless innocent individuals’ privacy 
rights is really worth granting the application.  If not, the court would then 
be armed with enough knowledge to determine the level of minimization 
procedures that are needed. 
C. Releasing a Procedure 
One main criticism of the FISC is its extreme secrecy and the body of 
secret case law that the court generates.175  The court should release an 
established procedure for hearing cases to combat this secrecy.  If the 
public had an inside account of what actually happened in the court once an 
application is received, they may be more accepting of the secret 
proceedings that occur.  Even if a record of proceedings and key 
interpretations of certain terms in the opinions cannot be released, releasing 
the procedure the court adheres to will create more transparency.  Current 
proposals for greater transparency involve releasing more declassified court 
opinions or summaries of these opinions.  Because of the inherent national 
security risk and the public’s likely failure to understand many of these 
court documents, the court should release an easy to understand account of 
exactly how all parties involved behave while in a FISC courtroom.  
The letter from Judge Walton is the best available account of the 
procedures that the court follows, but the letter lacks in substance.176  While 
Judge Walton does explain that court staffers are usually in communication 
with the government regarding applications,177 the letter does not explain 
the frequency of communications or the typical information that the court 
has to solicit from the government to make the application more complete.  
Further, this account fails to go into any detail involving the court 
procedures when the surveillance application is not immediately granted 
and the government has to go before a FISC judge.  An account of what 
actually happens inside the FISC courtroom, such as the most common 
reason the government has to defend the application in a proceeding and 
common questions that a judge asks in a hearing, would lead to greater 
transparency in the application process and increased acceptance by the 
 
 175. Lichtblau, supra note 114. 
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public.  The FISC Rules of Procedure suffer from the same deficiencies: 
they fail to provide any detail about the inner workings of the court.   
Releasing a detailed account of the procedure that the court utilizes 
when it receives an application is an effective solution to combat the 
questions that surround the way the court operates and the alleged carte 
blanche approval of governmental applications.  The more information that 
is released to the public, the greater the appearance of openness.  This 
information release would of course have to be executed with national 
security concerns in mind.  Any procedural information that would 
jeopardize the surveillance of targets should not be released.  
CONCLUSION 
Ayn Rand once stated that “[c]ivilization is the progress toward a 
society of privacy.  The savage’s whole existence is public, ruled by the 
laws of his tribe.  Civilization is the process of setting man free from 
men.”178  If this is true, society is moving in the wrong direction when it 
gives governmental-surveillance programs greater priority than preserving 
privacy rights.  The explosion of new technology and increased speed with 
which terrorist activities can be carried out do not justify the government’s 
disregard for the constitutional rights of American citizens. 
The court, initially intended to be the bastion of freedom and to guard 
against government encroachment, has stepped far outside of its watchdog 
role.  Since the passage of FISA, and especially since 9/11, the court has 
morphed into nothing more than a kangaroo court,179 existing only to give 
the illusion of oversight to quiet valid concerns about the government’s 
overexpansion into the private lives of U.S. citizens.  The blame cannot be 
placed solely on the court and its internal operations.  Most of the blame 
lies with Congress and the vast authority that it has granted the court to 
make far-reaching, nonreviewable decisions.  The current statutory 
provisions unacceptably allow the court to exercise wide discretion in 
granting surveillance requests and sweeping blanket warrants.  By 
awarding a large amount of unchecked power to the government, the court 
virtually invites constitutional violations.   
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